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Zusammenfassung

Dieser Artikel beschäftigt sich mit interpretativen Eigenschaften von Existenzkonstruktionen in diversen germanischen Sprachen, der Schwerpunkt liegt jedoch auf dem Deutschen. Seit Milsark (1974) werden in bezug auf die Existenzkonstruktion zwei Beschränkungen diskutiert: der Definitheitseffekt und die Prädikatsrestriktion. Das Hauptaugenmerk dieses Artikels liegt auf zweiterem. Ich behaupte, dass es Existenzprädikate gibt, die ausschließlich existentiell zu interpretieren sind, und dass diese Eigenschaft sie *individual-level* Prädikaten sehr ähnlich macht. Eine solche rein existentielle Konstruktion ist zum Beispiel *es gibt* im Deutschen, aber auch im Dänischen, Schwedischen und Isländischen finden sich solche Existenzkonstruktionen. Die entsprechende sprachenübergreifende Generalisierung lautet: Reine Existenzprädikate erlauben keine Quantifizierung über singuläre Situationen. Darin unterscheiden sie sich von den lokativen Existenzprädikaten, welche sowohl für Einzelsituationen wie auch für generelle ortsunabhängige Existenzaussagen verwendet werden können. Die meisten Sprachen scheinen über solche lokativen Existenzprädikate zu verfügen: z.B. *there is* im Englischen, *il y a* im Französischen, *hay* im Spanischen und auch *es hot* im Alemannischen. Letzteres wird aufgrund der syntaktischen Parallelität zu *es gibt* als Vergleichskonstruktion herangezogen, wobei die Unterschiede in der Interpretation aus den Argumentstrukturen der einzelnen zugrundeliegenden Verben abgeleitet werden. Diese Ableitung wird duch die diachrone Spekulation motiviert, dass unpersönliches *geben* das Resultat eines langen Grammatikalisierungsprozesses zu sein scheint, welcher das lexikalische Verb *geben* als Ausgangspunkt nimmt.

Christoph Caspar Pfisterer

THE REAL NATURE OF KRIPKE'S PARADOX

Abstract. Reading Kripke's *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, at first one can easily get confused about his claim that the problem discovered was a sort of ontological scepticism. Contrary to the opinion of a great number of contemporary philosophers who hold that rule-following brings up merely epistemological problems I will argue that the scepticism presented by Kripke really is an ontological scepticism because it is concerned with the exclusion of certain facts. The first part in this paper is dedicated to a presentation of Kripke's paradox with a clarification of the position of "plus/quus-talk" in the argument. Part two is engaged in one of his classical direct solutions: the dispositional theory which will serve as a preparation for the last section. Part three is concerned with Kripke's solution to the sceptical problem, ending with the question wether he is giving a real solution. In part four I will try to give an answer to those questions, distinguishing between two different versions of the problem given by the paradox; a wrong one and a correct one. Readers who are really fed up with the sceptical problem and its sceptical solution can skip part one, two and three, concentrating instead on my own argument for the real nature of the sceptical problem. In part five I will pick up some ideas from Horwich, who tries to give a "straight solution" to the paradox reanimating some weaker version of a dispositional theory of meaning. I will argue that Horwich's solution is misleading because he aims at the wrong version of the paradox.

1. The Sceptical Problem

It is a widespread conviction that being able to speak a language requires the ability to follow rules. It is often assumed that learning a language means learning rules for applying the words the language is composed of. This does not seem to be merely a truth about speaking a language but about all our actions. When a motorist comes to a halt in front of a red traffic light, we say that he knows the traffic regulations. When we are asked for reasons for his behavior, we answer that he is behaving such and such, *because* he learned something specific that leads him through traffic. The reason for his halting is something else which has to do with traffic lights and coming to a standstill. With language, the case is similar. We assume that there must be something that is responsible for one's utterances. Moreover, we think of the responsible force as something *in one's mind.* If you wonder how language is possible and if you want to explain why at least some of the noise we produce becomes meaningful, then you have to find *something else that explains* those things. Whatever circumstance we assume to be responsible for such and such behavior, it must differ from the behavior which it is responsible for. Otherwise we would call the explanation circular and we would hardly regard it as an explanation. Rules seem to satisfy this constraint; they differ from the behavior they are responsible for. But there are other difficulties. Kripke refers to Wittgenstein who discovered great problems within the maintained common picture.

> This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (Wittgenstein 1952, §201)

Wittgenstein asks if there could be an accordance relation between rules and courses of action. He argues against the accordance relation between a rule and its application. It is Saul A. Kripke's merit to have demonstrated Wittgenstein's negative answer to that question. He thinks of this paragraph as a central thought in Wittgenstein's later work. I believe the argument in §201 is best understood as *reductio ad absurdum* since that form allows us to evaluate every single assumption:

(i)   A specific rule determines a specific course of action.
(ii)   If a specific rule could determine a *specific* course of action, then the same rule could determine every *other* course of action.
(iii)   If a specific rule determines *every other* course of action, then it determines also a course of action *against* the rule.
(c)   Therefore: It is not the case that a specific rule determines a specific course of action.

Premise (i) represents the common assumption I have been talking about. Premise (iii) follows trivially from (ii) and hence does not need further explanations. Premise (ii) is quite tricky and its justification is best given by Kripke's "plus/quus talk" in his well known book about Wittgenstein (Kripke 1982). Kripke's argument is limited to a certain kind of rules, namely the class of rules for the application of words. Since there would need to be an additional argument that shows that eventually every kind of rule-following derives from the rules concerning the application of words, this step should be seen as a restraint for now. Kripke introduces a sceptic who wants me to add the two numbers 68 and 57. After a short hesitation I will answer with "125". But the sceptic does not seem to be satisfied - he wants to know the reasons for my saying "125" rather than something else. Slightly irritated by that question I answer that I learned to add in school, and that I was not that bad at mathematics. Repeating the computation I will come to the same result, which leads me to saying that 68 plus 57 is 125 and not anything else. "Sure," the sceptic says "I am not calling your mathematical competence into question, but it is possible that you learned something else at school, say *quaddition*. Think of the quaddition function as just like the addition function if the two numbers are both less than the highest number for which the function has actually been computed (let us say 57 for simplicity), otherwise the result is always 5. Now it seems to be possible that you meant *quus* by "plus" when I was asking you for the result of 57 plus 68. But if so, you should have answered with "5" because of the same reason: you learned it in school." Confused as I would be, I would try to answer that you cannot learn such cranky functions like *quaddition* in school without any intervention of the education department. The sceptic got to the point he wanted to be at and asks: "How can you exclude this possibility? In virtue of what fact could you exclude that you did not always mean *quus* by "plus"?"

Before I continue considering possible answers to that question, let me come back to premise (ii) for which the above line of argument is said to serve as a justification. The conversation with the sceptic tries to establish the truth of the conditional (ii). The sceptic presents a sceptical possibility according to which I might have *quadded* all this time without knowing. This seems to undermine our personal conviction that we mean something specific when we are talking. If there is always something different I could have meant as well by saying "plus", then there is nothing that could determine wether I added or quadded. And if there is nothing that could exclude my meaning quaddition by answering "125" to the given problem, then there

seems to be no possibility for a rule to determine a *specific* course of action. Uncountable many (indeed all) other courses of action could be correct in virtue of the rule's incapability to determine any one of them. Insofar as a rule can determine *every* other course of action, given that a rule can determine courses of action at all. Every justification for the application of a *specific* rule, can also be seen as a justification for the application of *another* rule. But why is this said to be paradoxical? From the fact that a rule determines every course of action such that all of them are in accordance with the rule, it follows that there is also one specific course of action which is in accord with the rule and is not in accord with the rule; this is paradoxical. And when two things are both in accord and in conflict with each other, then there seem to be no meaningful methods for determining whether they accord or conflict. That is why Wittgenstein writes that there is "neither accord nor conflict" (Wittgenstein 1952, §201).

Since the sceptical question is very confusing, it might be helpful to consider a perfectly common reaction to such a sceptic. I am inclined to say that if somebody knows what I mean at all, then it should be *me*. How can one deny that I am closest to what I mean by the words I utter? By "plus" I mean what I have *always* meant when I was asked to add. Nothing seems to have more plausibility than this, because there is some kind of *inner certainty* involved. Here in fact we are concerned with two different objections; let's start with the latter: the sceptic's reaction is quite staggering, because he agrees. "Of course you go on as before when asked for the sum of 68 and 57, but how can you know that by "plus" you didn't *always* mean quus?" Luckily the example function is chosen such that it coincides with the circumstance that I have never been asked for the sum of numbers higher than 57 - otherwise it would have become appearent much earlier that there is something wrong with me. This shows that the problem the paradox is concerned with is not a problem of doing right, but a problem of *knowing* the doing right since even my past cannot help to answer the sceptical question. To the former objection that I should have privileged access to what I mean by "plus", the sceptic answers, that this way of trying to rescue the common picture leads to an *infinite regress*. The objection says that to mean plus rather than quus by "plus" is identified with my possession of an experience of an *inner* quality, be it a picture, a headache or an itch; i.e. something that is possessed by myself. So the objection employs inner qualities that force me to say "125" rather than "5" to the sample computation. But not even the pictures are able to establish my meaning plus rather than quus, though they can establish "inner certainty"; they fail to prevent me from sceptical doubts, because for that purpose there would be a need for new rules connecting inner pictures and my meaning this rather than that. "How on earth would this headache help me figure out whether I ought to answer '125' or '5'?" (Kripke 1982, 42) Inner pictures would make a need for rules for interpreting rules. And if there is a need for a new rule to prevent from sceptical doubts about rule-following, then the new rules are not less concerned with sceptical doubts. So it comes that the problem stays a problem that demands for solution. "What can there be in my mind that I make use of when I act in the future? It seems that the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air." (Kripke 1982, 22)

2. Dispositions: A Direct Solution

Kripke himself takes eight different attempts into account that try to answer the sceptical question for facts in virtue of which one can exclude that he did always mean quaddition by "plus". All of them will turn out to be false, because they try to give an answer in the direct sense. "Direct" meaning in this case that they accept the sceptical challenge insofar as they try to give an answer that treats the sceptical possibility as a groundless threat. For our purposes it is sufficient to merely focuss on the dispositionalist's answer. An advocate of the dispositional analysis would answer that *there are facts,* namely dispositional facts, which make possible to differentiate between plus and quus. He claims that to mean something by a word does not consist of something that is *in my mind,* but of a certain *capacity* I have. He tries to isolate my having meant plus from my having meant quus by giving *two different dispositions.* Further, it is argued that to mean plus by "plus" is to be disposed to answer with the sum, in contrast to mean quus by "plus" which is equal to being disposed to answer with the *quum.* How can this theory be an objection to the sceptic, whose question was how one can know that he meant plus by "plus" rather than quus? In virtue of what fact can you exclude the sceptical quus-possibility? The dispositionalist's answer is that he agrees with the sceptic that there is nothing in my mind which enables to decide wether I meant addition rather than quaddition. Nevertheless there is a certain way I am disposed to behave. He identifies meaning plus by "plus" rather than quus with the disposition to build the sum rather than the quum. Therefore he would claim that I cannot know if I really mean plus by "plus", but if I *had been* asked for the sum of 68 and 57, I would have answered with "125".

For this kind of reasoning Kripke gives three different rejections of which the most persuasive is pointing at a condition any solution must satisfy, but the dispositional theory fails to satisfy. It is required that a "'fact' that determines what I mean (...) should *tell me* what I ought to do in each new instance." (Kripke 1982, 24; *my italics*) I will confine myself to Kripke's argument here and will return to this thought in part five when discussing Horwich's argument for this condition to be a "pseudo-constraint". Why must an answer that tries to provide a fact in virtue of which I mean plus by "plus" rather than quus take this condition into consideration? Why should the fact we are looking for have to be endowed with instructions? I will argue that Kripke has good grounds to call for an answer to satisfy this condition. The sceptic asked for reasons *why* I have answered with "125" and not with "5". Now, if an answer should be given, it should be given to *that* and no other question. Since it is a question for reasons, someone who wants to answer the question would have to mention what exactly made him say "125" rather than "5". If the answer amounts to saying that I have the property of saying "125" when asked for the sum of 68 and 57, then the sceptic's reply would be that he was not deaf and heard me saying "125" when asked for the sum of 68 and 57. He would just repeat his question for the *cause* of my saying "125" rather than "5". A reply that leaves the question it is supposed to be an answer to open, will hardly be seen as a satisfying reply. The problem with dispositional facts is that they merely establish a (counterfactual) conditional. One might be tempted to interpret such facts as the conditional in a *modus ponens* and hence as a reason for my saying this rather than that: If I had been asked for the sum of 68 and 57, then I would have answered with "125". I was asked for the sum of 68 and 57. Therefore my answer was "125". But the conditional does not provide anything new, it only connects the mathematical problem and my way of answering, and finally

ascribes this connection as a property belonging to me. In this regard the dispositional theory is begging the question. Hence it is not astonishing that the sceptic whose question concerns the reason for my answer would continue asking why this property is belonging to me.

The dispositional theory says that to mean plus is to build the sum and to mean quus is to build the quum when asked for an addition computation, hence the crucial fact for my meaning plus rather than quus can only lie in this difference. But since the sample computation is chosen such that both meaning the addition function and meaning the quaddition function can truly be said about me, how can the difference be contended? This leads to the insight that a disposition as a fact in question cannot merely be about me and the answer I gave (viz. the connecting conditional above), but also must force me to say this rather than that. Considering one's dispositions should give elucidation why he said this rather than that. To allow for this constraint is to postulate that dispositional facts in virtue of which I truly can be said to mean addition rather than quaddition should *tell me* how to answer the sample computation by means of giving instructions. If dispositional facts were endowed with instructions which help me to decide what I mean, then the dispositional theory could present an answer to the sceptic that goes beyond merely connecting his problem with my answering "125". That is Kripke's reason to require from facts to *tell me* what I ought to do; i.e. it should keep us from begging the question. If once this constraint is established, then it is obvious that satisfying the condition immediately leads to regress. Since the dispositional fact is endowed with instructions, I have to be able to follow these rules.

It remains to point out that the problem of rule-following stands firm even if the dispositional facts we are given would involve a complete list of infinitely many sums (and not quums). Such a list of course would determine exactly the addition function and nothing else. But how can it be of help to me to make my meaning the addition function exclusive? In the end I could be said to interact with that list in a quus-like way, hence the list even if it is endowed with instructions cannot exclude the possibility that I always have quadded instead of added. Note that the rejection of the dispositional story does not depend on the matter that I have thought of only finitely many cases. (see Kripke 1982, fn. 34)

3. The Sceptical Solution

So far it seems that we have to break off the search for facts which make attributions of meaning true or false. But what would a world look like without facts in virtue of which the sentence "By 'plus' I mean plus." is true? It would seem that the possibility of meaning something by a word is excluded as well in that world. "Each new application we make is a leap in the dark; any present intention could be interpreted so as to accord with anything we may choose to do." (Kripke 1982, 55) In such a world all individuals could be said to mean anything arbitrary. Since it is impossible for a person to give a justification for their meaning this rather than that, nobody could trust another meaning attributing statement.

One of the components responsible for the paradox was the view that there are truth conditions for the above type of sentences. The search for facts that constitute the truth conditions and therefore make instances of that sentence type true or false ended without results. But from the fact that there are no such facts does not follow either that there is no meaning at all, nor that it is impossible to make sense of sentences like

"By 'plus' I mean plus." The main goal in this section is to explore the implications of there being no such facts. For that enterprise it will be best to repeat the way Kripke proposes to guard the world against the picture mentioned above. Again, it is his merit having connected the problem of following a rule and Wittgenstein's remarks on private language; i.e. he argues for the latter to be a solution for the former. It will turn out that he switches over to another kind of solution called "sceptical solution". The characterization of a sceptical solution is its accepting the sceptical challenge in a different manner than direct solutions: it repeats the problem it is a solution for. Insofar it is an indirect answer to the sceptic and it takes a lot of endeavor to understand this way of treating a problem. The sceptical solution does not make demands on facts in virtue of which a sentence like "By 'plus' I mean plus." is true. Kripke marks his solution as a step from truth conditions for sentences of that form to assertability conditions; i.e. conditions under which the above sentence can be asserted. This sounds astonishing, because we would say that there are no restrictions for the assertion of such sentences. It is my aim in this section to empathize the move Kripke makes when he is talking about "contraposition", which I think is the most important step towards sceptical solutions.

Because the private language argument is indirect and as Kripke says an application of the rule-following paradox, it again can best be represented through *reductio ad absurdum*:

(i)   There is a private language.
(ii)   If there is a private language, then there is only one person with access to the meanings of the expressions of that language.
(iii)   The meanings of the private language are accessible to only one person.
(iv)   It is not possible that the meanings of an arbitrary language are accessible to only   one person.
(v)   The meanings of the private language are accessible to only one person and it is not possible that the meanings of an arbitrary language are accessible to only one person.
(c)   Therefore: It is not the case that (i).

Premise (iv) derives from the rule-following paradox and hence can be introduced as a justified premise. It says that the meanings of a language cannot be accessible to solely one person, because there are no facts in virtue of which that person could apply them correctly, and the words we utter would still be nothing else than noise. Premises (i) - (iii) are concerned with the extension of "private language". The strategy the "sceptical solution" suggests is to bring the sceptic to agree with every single premise, and since the argument is deductively valid, he has to agree with the conclusion as well, which seems to be against the hinted intuition. The given depiction satisfies both demands: it is indirect in this sense, and it takes up the sceptical consequences of the paradox such that the private language argument turns out to be an application of the rule-following paradox. That's what I meant by saying that the "sceptical solution repeats the problem it is a solution for."

But what exactly does follow from the fact that there is no private language? Since of course there is language, its being meaningful derives from something other than private rule-following. There is a need for more than solely one single person when the uttered words should be more than only noise. Words do not inhabit people's

minds with meaning, but it can be said that they are meaningful within a "community of minds". If language is not private, then it must be public. Kripke merely gives some rough characterizations of completion of meaning within a language community, and he is doing right as it will turn out. We need to clarify the consequences for the private language argument to the concept of following a rule.

Up to now, we know that it is not only because of a private affair that some of the noise we produce means something, but we still are surrounded by people who say that they mean plus by "plus". How then can we make sense of such sentences? Kripke's answer to that question is the real core of his sceptical solution; he calls it "contraposition", which means the inversion of a conditional. Similar to Hume (Hume 1748, Section V), Kripke questions a lawlike connection between two things. Hume was concerned with the connection between cause and effect, Kripke is concerned with the connection between utterances and their meanings. Hume solved the problem through making *us* responsible for that connection (instead of nature), and so does Kripke. According to Kripke, it is not the fact that somebody means plus by "plus" rather than quus that causes him to say the correct result, because there is no such fact. Consequentially Kripke shows that it is merely common for us that we expect a connection of the form:

(1)   If X means plus by "plus", then X will answer with "125" to "68 plus 57".

It was Kripke's result which showed that there can be no facts that would make instances of the sentence type corresponding to (1) true or false. And for the abstinence of such facts, Kripke interprets (1) as follows:

(2)   If X does **not** answer with "125" to "68 plus 57", then X does **not** mean plus by "plus"

Notice that though the two conditionals are logically equivalent (i.e. (1) entails (2) and *vice versa*), they can have different meanings. The first conditional makes X's meaning plus responsible for the answer "125"; the latter does not. The second conditional is much weaker because it only expresses a necessary condition for our judgment that the speaker X means plus by "plus"; i.e. he has to answer "125" to the sample computation. Conditional (1), in contrast, expresses a sufficient but controversial condition for one's correct answer. The corresponding picture to (1) is that in virtue of whatever fact the antecedens is fulfilled, the consequence is that X says the correct result. The crucial difference to (1) is that in (2) we do not conclude from correct meaning to the correct result any longer, but from deviating results to different meaning. It is essential that (2) states a truth about the *grammar* of the concept of "following a rule".

Kripke has often been accused for his sceptical and "negative" solution, because he did not execute the completion of "meaning" within a community of speakers. At once the question arises why the community should be spared with sceptical challenge concerning rule-following, while all of its isolated components fail to establish meaning? If the sceptical solution is merely understood as a community that solely consists of particular individuals that desperately try to follow rules correctly, then it is obvious that the problem gets imported into its solution. I will argue that this objection must be rejected because it is based on a *fallacy of*

composition. A single person is a special case of a community and not *vice versa*. To the question, why a community should have better reasons to follow a rule correctly than a single person, we can answer that even if every property that belongs to an individual also belongs to the community the person is part of, the community can have properties that all of its participants fail to manifest. From the fact that every single part of a machine is lightweight, we cannot infer that it is the case that the whole machine is light too. So the objection seems to underlie a traditional part/whole problem.

Another well known objection is given by Fogelin. He holds against Kripke that since a community does not make possible to halt the regress, the sceptical solution has to consist of two components: "training" and "public check":

> "It is trough *training* (not a *public check*) that we are able to halt the regress of interpretations and follow a rule as a matter of course. [...] It is through a public check that we gain an independent standpoint that allows us to distinguish following a rule from merely thinking that we are following a rule." (Fogelin 1976, 243)

Fogelin thinks that training somehow achieves more than a community that passes judgment on its participants. I doubt that a speaker tortured with thumbscrews suddenly reaches the conviction that he is adding rather than quadding. The possibility that he is following a quus-like function remains even if he was barbarically educated and trained. It is true that Fogelin accepts only a sceptical solution, but he fails to keep his promise because of the direct character the training-argument has. Since the paradox excludes one's justification for following a rule correctly, it also weakens the statement that 68 plus 57 is equal to 125, because I was trained such and such. Training cannot be an adequate justification for my meaning addition rather than quaddition, because the sceptical challenge concerned the training situation I had in school; the sceptic asked for the reasons to exclude that I have learned the quaddition function. Nevertheless, Fogelin attributes importance to public check: the public is responsible for the distinction between following a rule and merely thinking that we are following a rule. The criterion for that distinction is the independent standpoint the community has and which single participants lack. As a matter of fact, training is just a special case of public check and not *vice versa*. Training is the situation when the community is reduced to another single speaker which we would call "teacher". This insight leads to the conclusion that Fogelin's solution is contained in, and hence is at least just as weak as Kripke's solution is.

4. Regress and Singularity Condition

At this time, I would like to include some of my own work about Wittgenstein and Kripke. Several times Kripke points to the fact that we have to do with an ontological scepticism and not merely with an epistemological scepticism. The epistemological scepticism would hold that the facts for following a rule correctly have not been found up to now. Moreover, it denies the knowability of such facts; i.e. even if they were found, they could not help us in deciding between 125 and 5. An ontological scepticism concerning those facts must be much more fundamental. Kripke insists that even "an omniscient being, with access to *all* available facts, still would not find any fact that differentiates between the plus and the quus hypotheses." (Kripke 1982, 39)

The simplest rejection of that idea is to say that knowledge of those facts is analytically involved in the concept of omniscience, and that therefore a being possessing the property of omniscience also has knowledge about such facts in virtue of which I mean plus by "plus" rather than quus. What could Kripke have had in mind with "ontological scepticism"? Such a scepticism should not only call into question the knowability of certain facts, it rather should exclude the existence of this kind of facts. Since Kripke is not telling more than the omnicient being's inability to find such facts, I should explore this thought.

From now on, I will say that a fact is *accompanying* a rule. This *terminus technicus* means that there is something - be it in our experience or in the world - that relates to the application of a specific rule. Maybe it is easier to think that this relation consists in a fact referring to a rule. To put it more precisely: a fact *x* refers to a rule *R* if and only if *x* and *R* do always occur together or do not occur together; every other case is excluded. You can often find the position that the rule-following paradox only brings about epistemological difficulties, and hence Kripke fails to establish ontological doubts. Advocates of this position refer to Wittgenstein who never would have had in mind to state ontological problems. I will argue that this interpretation of the rule-following paradox is not adequate to the scepticism Kripke and also Wittgenstein felt forced to accept. Moreover, I will conclude that the wrong version of the paradox excludes rule-accompanying facts on the basis of epistemological grounds. Advocates of the wrong version argue that the rule-accompanying facts cannot fall into the scope of knowledge because this would lead to a regress. They deny the predicate of *knowability* for such facts, which still leaves open the question of their *existence*, because one cannot infer non existence from unknowability. First I will show that you cannot establish ontological scepticism for lack of the property of knowability. Then I will present an alternative interpretation which is adequate to Kripke's ontological scepticism concerning rules. The crucial difference will be that the rule-accompanying facts are not merely excluded from the scope of knowledge, but more general from the scope of what there is. We will see that the justification for this explosive conclusion is that such facts would have to be *absurd objects*.

Let us imagine a world containing facts for the correct application of a rule. What would such a world be like? As an inhabitant of that world I would be endowed with facts telling me whether I meant plus rather than quus. After every addition computation there would be a fact telling me whether I just have added or quadded. It is easy to reject that view: whatever the fact is telling me, I have to understand it. To understand on the other hand means to be exposed to sceptical doubts because I need to apply rules of interpretation to the fact. For the correct interpretation of the fact's instructions I ought to be endowed with a further criterion or fact in virtue of which I can differentiate between my following the interpretation rule and the possible *quinterpretation* rule. We already got to know this regress. Notice that the regress is of epistemological nature, because in every single step we are asked for a cognitive capacity which enables us to interpret the given fact. But the regress originates from rules for interpreting rules - hence it is not possible to establish an ontological exclusion of certain facts. The correct conclusion of the regress version of the paradox is:

(3)   Even if there would be a fact *x* accompanying rule *R*, we could not have any knowledge of *x*.

But obviously (3) makes no ontological restrictions concerning the existence of facts; it only expresses a counterfactual conditional which can be read as:

(4)   There is a possible world W such that W contains a fact x which is accompanying rule R, and we do not have any knowledge of x in W.

The alternative version of the paradox should be able to deny the possibility of W. For that purpose Kripke should have tried to show that rule-accompanying facts have to be excluded not because there can be no knowledge about them, but because they do not fit in our ontology.

The second motivation for the exclusion of rule-accompanying facts does not rely on regress, but on a *singularity condition* which facts of that kind ought to satisfy but necessarily fail to satisfy. Again, let us try to imagine a world containing rule-accompanying facts. The demand for such facts is that they provide grounds for differentiating between my meaning plus and my meaning quus. Therefore the condition such a fact has to satisfy is to appear with exactly one single rule, not more and not less. This condition put as follows is totally independent of knowability:

(5)   If the fact x accompanies the rule R, then every rule R', accompanied from x as well, is identical with R.

Strictly speaking there is a further singularity condition that has to be satisfied, because there should be only one fact for a given rule:

(6)   If x is the fact that accompanies an arbitrary rule R, then every y that accompanies R as well is identical with x.

Condition (6) excludes that two or more facts together accompany the same rule. That is a necessary restriction, because otherwise we would not be able to isolate the decisive fact. If condition (6) is not satisfied I would not know whether the picture I have in mind or the itch I feel in the back of my knee is responsible for my meaning plus by "plus" rather than quus. For our purposes we can refrain from condition (6), because it does not help to decide if the paradox results in ontological or epistemological problems.

Condition (5) says that the accompanying fact for R must appear *only* if R is applied: the fact x ought to refer rigidly to R. That means that to every fact there has to be exactly one rule. And (5) is a condition facts necessarily have to satisfy in order to be a possible solution to the problem. If Kripke would succeed to show that (5) cannot be satisfied from ontological reasons, then he would have established ontological scepticism. Since condition (5) requires that R and R' are identical if both are accompanied by fact x, and since two sets (the extensions of addition and quaddition function can be written as infinite sets of triples) are identical if and only if they have exactly the same elements, condition (5) requires that the extensions of the addition function (to which hereinafter is referred to with "A") and quaddition function (to which hereinafter is referred to with "Q") are constituted of exactly the same elements. Therefore an accompanying fact requires that the two functions whose applications it accompanies are identical. The singularity condition can be best represented through identity between the intended function and all non-intended, quus-like functions. To put it more formal: the sets

$A = \{..., <2, 2, 4>, <2, 3, 5>, ..., <68, 57, 125>,......, <m, n, r>\}$ and

$Q = \{..., <2, 2, 4>, <2, 3, 5>, ..., <68, 57, 5>,......,<m, n, r \mid r=5$ for every m, n 57$>\}$

are required to be identical. But the identity relation can never hold between those two sets, because they do not consist of the same elements. I said that an accompanying fact would have to appear with A but not with Q, hence is a fact against the sceptical hypothesis. To establish ontological exclusion of such facts, it remains to show that the fact x necessarily accompanies both, A and Q. To show this, we need to ask what it is for a fact to accompany a given function. Imagine there being a small green lamp, which goes on when anywhere in the world a triple of A occurs. Take waiter Jules, writing the numbers "20", "87" and "107" on a piece of scrap paper. Let us assume that those three ciphers represent the price which Jacques, one of his guests, has to pay for a delicious meal and a beer. The triple <20, 87, 107> is an element of A and hence the green lamp goes on. If Jules would have written a receipt represented by the triple <20, 87, 5>, Jacques would have hoped that Jules was not realizing his mistake and the green lamp would not have went on. So far the green lamp seems to be a good example for a reliable fact, that accompanies only one rule and therefore satisfies condition (5). But let us consider Jacqueline, the other guest at "Chez Jules". She had only two beers, and therefore Jules' receipt should represent the triple <20, 20, 40>. It goes without saying that the small green lamp goes on likewise in that case. Now the question arises if Jules was adding or quadding. Since the triple <20, 20, 40> is an element of both A and Q, it is impossible to decide in virtue of the green lamp alone if Jules is adding or quadding. The same fact would accompany at least two different rules and hence violate condition (5), because all rules that are applied when the green lamp goes on ought to be identical. If a fact x appears with every single element of A, how can one exclude that it appears with elements of Q as well? There is no way to exclude such possibilities for mathematical reasons, because there can be infinitely many sets composed of partly the same elements as A, but different from A. What this example shows is that it is not possible for a fact to restrict the diversity of different sets. Moreover, the exclusion of facts accompanying only one rule is based on mathematical and hence logical reasons. It is not possible for a fact to exist in our world, and to occur with the applications of only one single rule and no others, because there is always a range of other rules, whose elements the fact would accompany as well. The admittance of such facts into our ontology at the very least amounts to an offense against the logical laws of identity. Since logical laws range even over possible worlds, we now have reached a stronger version of the paradox, than the regress lead us to. The exclusion of rule-accompanying facts based on the regress still left open there being a possible world W such that W contains a fact x which is accompanying rule R. The only thing excluded is the knowability of x. The exclusion of rule-accompanying facts in virtue of the impossibility to satisfy the singularity condition even excludes the existence of W and hence of rule-accompanying facts in general.

Let me summarize the argument. The regress version of the rule-following paradox lead to an epistemological regress: whatever the green lamp is telling us about Jules' adding or quadding, we would have to interpret it. But to maintain that the appointment of interpreting green lamps does not engender any difficulties just would be a *petitio principii*. The solution of the problem concerning meaning would rely on

the problem's being solved already. For that reason, we were inclined to exclude the knowability of such facts. We then considered another constraint: rule-accompanying facts necessarily have to accompany exactly one rule, in order to be an account for a solution. As it turned out, even best-designed facts like the small green lamp fail to make sentences like "Jules means addition by "plus" rather than quaddition" true or false, because of mathematical reasons. Whatever the green lamp is indicating, it can not exclude that the triple in question also belongs to various other sets of triples. Since the fact x ought to have the property of making all those sets identical, and since they cannot be identical because they are not composed of only same elements, a fact satisfying the singularity condition would be an absurd object, and hence cannot fit into our ontology.

5. Horwich's "Straight Solution"

In his recent book *Meaning*, Paul Horwich attacks Kripke's doubts concerning rules for at least five different reasons and comes to the conclusion that "his [Kripke's] sceptical thesis is unjustified" (Horwich 1998, 224). That remark alone should make us become suspicious. Why does the sceptical quus-like possibility have to be justified? It is true that we understand the sceptical question for facts in virtue of which you can exclude that you did not always mean quus by "plus". What is there to be justified over and above our understanding of the question? The strategy Horwich pursues in order to establish his weaker form of dispositional theory is to argue that at least some of the constraints Kripke demands to be satisfied are "pseudo-constraints" and "ill-motivated" and hence do not need to be taken into account. Instead of discussing Horwich's efforts to show that his *use theory of meaning* is compatible with Kripke's sceptical conclusions about meaning, I will argue that Horwich misses the real nature of the paradox, because he directs it only at its epistemological aspects.

Horwich's main objection concerns all theories of meaning which state a non-semantic relation between a word and the object it refers to. He argues against any form of reductive analysis of meaning:

(7) X means F by "w" iff $R(X, "w", f)$

whereby "w" stands for an arbitrary word, "F" for a concept and "f" is a variable for instances that fall under that concept. "R" represents an alleged mystery connection between a word and the objects it refers to. Horwich's line of argument is based on the simple but crucial observation that there is no reason for a word to be connected with an object. For our example the instance for (7) has to be expressed as follows:

(7')   Jules means plus by "plus" iff $R(Jules, "plus", A)$

According to Horwich every theory of meaning that involves a kind of relation R is based on the *fallacy of constitution*. He claims that we cannot conclude from the fact that 'the linguistic object "plus" means plus' has the relational structure that '"w" means F' that whatever constitutes the meaning, it must be of the same logical structure. "[I]t is a fallacy to assume that whenever a fact has a certain component, then whatever constitutes this fact must contain either that same component or alternatively something that constitutes it." (Horwich 1998, 21) To cut a long story

short, I will try to put Horwich's main objection in easy words. Since the word "frog" has meaning, we assume there to be something which constitutes the meaning of "frog". But as a matter of principle it is wrong to think of the meaning-constituting entity that it is connected with frogs, just because the linguistic object "frog" means frog. According to Horwich, any attempt to explain meaning that violates this principle compulsively has to postulate a non-semantic relation between "frog" and frogs, "plus" and A etc. Since he argues that the meaning-constituting entity does not have to be of the same logical structure as the meaning it constitutes, Horwich's observation is also directed towards Kripke's rejection of the dispositional theory. He conjectures that Kripke failed to notice a certain dispositional theory that does not come under the dilemma of either being circular (excluding mistakes by excluding mistakes) or belonging to science fiction (infinite large memory); i.e. he proposes to say that X means plus by "plus" rather than quus if and only if there is a certain relation between X and the word "plus". To put in accord with his own formulation:

(8) X means plus by "plus" iff $R_1(X, "plus")$ and
       X means quus by "plus" iff $R_2(X, "plus")$

The crucial difference to Kripke's discussion of the dispositional analysis is that (8) is a two-place relation and hence makes reference neither to A nor to Q. If one wonders why (8) is said to give an answer to the sceptic while (7') fails to, maybe a comparison between the relations R_1, R_2 and R can help. Whereas (7') gives a reason why X means plus by "plus" (namely X's relation to the linguistic object "plus", such that he applies "plus" to triples of numbers if and only if the triple is an element of A), definition (8) gives no such reason. There is nothing more to be said about X's meaning plus than her relation to the linguistic object "plus". Further, Horwich argues that R_1 and R_2 should be seen as relational *use properties* belonging to the word "plus". Notice that he does not claim that the use property R_1 *is* the meaning of "plus" but merely that R_1 *constitutes* the meaning of "plus". Unfortunately he neglects to give closer specifications of the constituency relation. However, his weak dispositional theory ascribes properties to linguistic objects and refrains from connecting individuals, words and infinite sets like A and Q. That is exactly where the problem gets started again: if R_1 and R_2 should be seen as properties belonging to the word "plus", how can Horwich exclude that there are cranky, quus-like properties sticking on "plus"? The relation between me and the word "plus" gives no reason to exclude that I always meant quus by "plus", because to whatever I have been applying "plus", it will never give a criterion to differentiate between R_1 and R_2. Note further that the two biconditionals in (8) express that X means different things by "plus", hence there must be a difference to specify. But since the two specifications R_1 and R_2 are both made of exactly the same elements, the relevant difference can only lie in how R_1 and R_2 relate their respective elements. Thus the problem becomes that of specifying R_1 and R_2, such that there remains a difference between meaning plus and meaning quus.

For the purpose of my argument I will accept Horwich's objection against relationality. Horwich gives a reason why Kripke is "implicitly ruling out this more liberal, non-relational form of use theory" (Horwich 1998, 219) or dispositional theory, namely his demand of dispositions which let you know how to proceed when asked for the sum of two numbers. Remember Kripke's claim that every fact that determines whether I meant addition rather than quaddition should *tell me* what I ought to do in each new instance. "The criterion is meant to enable us to 'read off'

which function I mean by a given function symbol from my disposition." (Kripke 1982, 26) I argued in part two that Kripke is right in making demands on the "read off" condition to be satisfied, since a direct answer to the sceptic should avoid begging the question. Now I will argue that if we refrain from the satisfaction of the "read off" condition, we only get around the epistemological problem the paradox presents. This does not, as Horwich believes, establish dispositions as facts in virtue of which I can truly be said to mean this rather than that. Hence the elimination of this condition is pointing at the paradox in its weakest form. Since Kripke requires that it has to be possible to "read off" from a meaning-constituting property which meaning it constitutes, he assumes there being a connection between the word and its meaning. Consider an arbitrary property which constitutes the meaning of the word "frog", say u("frog"). It is said that "frog" means frog because of the property u belonging to "frog". Horwich's objection against Kripke results in the observation that if we require to be able to know which meaning "frog" has, from u's belonging to "frog" alone, then we assume there to be a relation between the word "frog" and frogs. Since we should be able to apply the word "frog" correctly, and since we are merely given the word "frog" endowed with its meaning-constituting property u, there must be a relation corresponding to (7) which lets me know what the meaning of "frog" is. It must somehow teach me to apply "frog" to all and only frogs. For that reason Horwich warns us that if we require the "read off" condition to be satisfied and if we were looking for facts which let us know which rule we have been applying, we immediately come to the relational view of an analysis of meaning, which itself is based on the fallacy of constitution. "And this 'reading off' requirement is supposed to be tantamount to the view that a reductive theory of meaning properties would have to have the form: "w" means $F = R($"w",f)." (Horwich 1998, 24; *I adapted the variables to the given examples*)

I will show that even if Horwich's efforts to establish a light version of the dispositional theory are correct, he fails to give the intended "straight solution to Kripke's sceptical paradox" (which is not astonishing when one is engaged in the rule-following paradox). Horwich argues that taking into consideration the "read off" condition is *sufficient* for the strong relational view of meaning, which itself is based on fallacy, hence it is better to do without "read off" condition. It seems that the "read off" condition has to be ruled out, since facts which tell how to proceed, or facts that enable to read off what is meant by a word lead to regress. Therefore, the only progress that abstinence from "read off" condition can make is to avoid the regress. It was a result of the rule-following paradox that a fact which leads to say "125" rather than "5" by giving instructions makes a need for rules for interpreting rules. It appears that rejecting the "read off" condition would let you find facts for the correct application of a rule, but they would lack of the property to tell you which rule you are concerned with. If so, refraining from the satisfaction of the "read off" condition, only gets around the epistemological problem the paradox presents; i.e. we are preserved from the need for rules in order to interpret the facts in question. But this does not, as Horwich thinks, establish dispositions as facts for meaning this rather than that. He holds that "the proper conclusion is not that meanings are not dispositions, but a strengthened conviction that the naive intuition of guidance should not be taken too literally." (Horwich 1998, 218) Hence it must be assumed that Horwich leaves open the possibility of rule-accompanying facts, and merely excludes their knowability. This conjecture is strengthened in an earlier paper in which he argues that the rule-following paradox only excludes "that there *must* exist inner states of understanding

[...]. But that is not to question that there could be good a posteriori grounds for accepting such a picture." (Horwich 1984, 171) The picture Horwich is talking about concerns an unimpaired confidence in facts in virtue of which one can truly be said to mean this rather than that (e.g. the small green lamp). As I argued in part four, to prevent an explanation of meaning from regress does not establish a theory of meaning that already handled the real nature of the rule-following paradox. The very problem Horwich should take care of is the problem of facts to satisfy the singularity condition. Whatever we take the meaning-constituting property to be, it cannot exclude to constitute a quite different meaning than expected. I argued that this happens for logical reasons. Therefore, even Horwich's weaker form of dispositional theory fails to give an account of meaning that is able to elucidate how it is possible that one can truly be said to mean this rather than that by a word.

Again, let me summarize the argument: according to Horwich, a theory of meaning has not to be relational (based on his "fallacy of composition"). Nevertheless, there seems to remain a small possibility for a weak version of dispositional theory which is not required to satisfy the "read off" condition, because to satisfy the "read off" condition is sufficient to get to a relational theory of meaning. I argued that to refrain from that condition at best avoids the regress which is the epistemological aspect of the paradox. But it lacks to take into consideration the ontological one, which would be to satisfy the singularity condition. To solve the paradox in the "straight" way Horwich intends to do, means to give a reason why a meaning-constituting property constitutes exactly the meaning it constitutes and no other. But this would mean to exclude quus-like possibilities which presents an offense against logical laws; i.e. various, merely partial identical sets would have to be identical. Hence, even Horwich's weak form of dispositional theory fails to give an account of meaning which also explains how it is possible that one means this rather than that by a word.

The general impression of Horwich's defense of the use theory against Kripke's and also Wittgenstein's sceptical doubts is rather that he tries to prove that he means this rather than that. I think this is an error of judgment concerning scepticism in general. The problem is not that we cannot know what we mean, but that there are many other things we could have meant as well. The picture I indented to establish is close to a statement by Nelson Goodman concerning another sceptical problem: "The problem of induction is not a problem of *demonstration* but a problem of defining the *difference* between valid and invalid predictions." (Goodman 1955, 68; *my italics*) We can adapt this sentence for our purposes: the problem of rule-following is not a problem of demonstration but a problem of defining the difference between meaning plus and meaning quus. It is not surprising that philosophers try to argue against the negative picture of meaning Wittgenstein and Kripke leave behind. Since the paradox offers the non-refutable possibility that there is always something else we could mean by the words we use, we should feel to be exposed to constant misunderstanding. I think that an attempt to explain that we mean *specific* things by the words we use should rather involve a theory of content (viz. *intentionality* and the *objectivity of thoughts*), since there are good reasons to assume that we are directed to exactly one object when we mean, desire or hate something. But that's another story.

As a friend of mine once said: "Plus or quus, they both are so good, I can't decide." However, I think that this is much closer to the real nature of Kripke's paradox than any attempt to give a straight solution by means of a weak dispositional theory.

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Zusammenfassung

Mit seiner gewagten Interpretation von Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über das Befolgen von Regeln hat Saul Kripke in der analytischen Philosophie der Sprache für viel Aufregung gesorgt. Für gewöhnlich wird angenommen, daß das Lernen einer Sprache im Lernen von Verwendungsregeln für die Ausdrücke dieser Sprache besteht. Diese Regeln sollen garantieren, daß ein sprachlicher Ausdruck auf das angewendet wird, was der Sprecher mit dem Ausdruck meint. Kripke hat auf eindrucksvolle Art und Weise gezeigt, daß es keine Tatsachen gibt, die ausschließen, daß ein Sprecher mit einem Wort irgend etwas anderes meint. Merkwürdigererweise verstehen viele Autoren das *Regelparadox* derart, daß es die Existenz dieser Tatsachen aus *epistemologischen* Gründen bedroht. Oft wird sogar zum Ausdruck gegeben, daß eine erfolgreiche Suche nach solchen Tatsachen eine Theorie der Bedeutung etablieren würde. In diesem Beitrag wird argumentiert, daß diese Interpretation auf einem schwerwiegenden Mißverständnis beruht. In Wirklichkeit schließt das Regelparadox die genannten Tatsachen aus *ontologischen* Gründen aus, da sie eine *Einzigkeitsbedingung* erfüllen müßten: Eine Tatsache müßte für das Befolgen von genau einer Regel stehen. Es wird argumentiert, daß Tatsachen diese Bedingung aus logischen Gründen nicht erfüllen können. Im letzten Teil wird auf Paul Horwichs jüngsten Lösungsversuch des Regelparadoxes eingegangen. Es soll sich herausstellen, daß er derselben Verwechslung zum Opfer gefallen ist. Seine schwache Dispositionstheorie, die das richtige Verwenden von Ausdrücken mittels *Gebrauchseigenschaften* garantieren will, erfüllt die Einzigkeitsbedingung ebenfalls nicht.